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A B S T R A C T
In the present research, we tested whether the prospect of moral failure or moral gain can motivate (some)
people to confront racism. We investigated the influence of moral loss and moral gain mindset on people's
tendency to contest racism as a function of their moral commitment to non-prejudice. Drawing on research on
regulatory focus, we predicted that a moral loss mindset (vs. control) would increase confronting tendencies
among those who are morally committed to non-prejudice (to safeguard their moral self-concept). A moral gain
mindset (vs. control) was expected to increase confronting among those who are less committed to non-prejudice
(to enhance their moral self-concept). In Experiment 1, participants were presented with racist scenarios. We
varied the framing of moral considerations involved (loss vs. gain vs. control) and assessed confronting inten-
tions. In Experiment 2, participants went through a moral mindset intervention. After a few days, using a be-
havioral paradigm, we tested their actual confronting during a racist situation. We found partial evidence to our
predictions. Those highly committed to non-prejudice (as indicated by a measure of moral conviction in
Experiment 1, but by a measure of moral identity in Experiment 2) were significantly more prone to confront in
the loss mindset condition than in the control. Confronting in the gain condition was not significantly different
than in the control condition at any level of moral commitment to non-prejudice. These findings suggest that a
moral loss mindset intervention may be effectively used in promoting (some) people's tendency to speak up
against racism.
Elin Ersson, a young university student boarded a plane heading
from Sweden to Turkey in July 2018 to protest the deportation of an
Afghan asylum seeker, who was forced on that flight. She refused to sit
down, preventing take off, until the man was removed from the aircraft.
Ersson sacrificed a lot. During the protest she faced an angry cabin
crew, complaints by other passengers, and potential legal charges.
Eventually, Ersson succeeded in her protest and received an ovation
from passengers and was widely praised on social media around the
world for her intervention, many calling her a hero. The current re-
search addresses the motives and the mechanisms underlying such
confronting behavior by third-party individuals. We investigated how a
prospective personal moral failure (of not intervening) or moral gain (of
intervening) can play a key role in motivating people like Ersson to
perform courageous acts.
Moral courage is a willingness to take a stand in defense of one's
own moral principles even when others do not (Miller, 2000; Skitka,
2012). Ersson's action is unique to the extent that the majority of people
think they would speak up against intergroup bias, however, often they
do not. For example, even though White Americans anticipated feeling
upset and taking action against someone who espouses racial bias
against a Black person, those put in that actual situation reported little
negative affect and forewent punishing the racist person (Karmali,
Kawakami, & Page-Gould, 2017; Kawakami, Dunn, Karmali, & Dovidio,
2009). Similarly, heterosexual participants who imagined witnessing a
homophobic slur reported higher intentions of confronting than people
who actually witnessed the slur (Crosby & Wilson, 2015). Such inaction
is unfortunate because confronting, especially if done by third-party
individuals, can actually change perpetrators' beliefs and reduce pre-
judice (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Czopp, Monteith, & Mark, 2006).
Research suggest that people fail to exhibit moral courage, and
confront intergroup bias because they rather avoid interpersonal costs,
such as being perceived as a troublemaker, being disliked or experi-
encing retaliation (e.g., Eliezer & Major, 2012; Kaiser & Miller, 2001,
2003; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 1999). While it has been
seldom discussed in the confronting literature, omission of intervening
can entail personal, psychological costs as well, in the form of deflating
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103833
Received 1 October 2018; Received in revised form 25 June 2019; Accepted 26 June 2019
⁎ Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University, 1064 Budapest, Izabella street 46, Hungary.
E-mail address: szekeres.hanna@ppk.elte.hu (H. Szekeres).
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 84 (2019) 103833
Available online 18 July 20190022-1031/ © 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY-NC-ND/4.0/).
T
one's moral self-concept. Indeed, maintaining a non-prejudiced self-
image is important to many individuals (Dutton & Lennox, 1974;
Monteith, 1993; Plant & Butz, 2006; Plant & Devine, 1998). When in-
dividuals' non-prejudiced identity is threatened, they employ different
strategies to reinstate it, such as engaging in downward social com-
parisons with bigots (O'Brien et al., 2010; Wills, 1981), inhibiting
prejudiced responses to jokes (Monteith, 1993), or being more generous
to an outgroup member (Dutton & Lake, 1973). Thus, we can expect
individuals who identify as non-prejudiced to be motivated to confront
racism when feeling their moral identity is at risk - which likely is the
case when they witness racism and have an opportunity to intervene
(i.e., confront). Along the same lines, confronting can also provide
personal gains by enhancing one's moral self-concept. Accordingly, in-
dividuals might be motivated to confront racism because they construe
it as an opportunity for self-enhancement (i.e., desire to increase posi-
tive self-concept; Leary, 2007) or self-improvement (i.e., the desire to
improve aspects of one's self; Sedikides, 1993; Sedikides & Hepper,
2009).
Thus, we here propose that considerations about one's own morality
likely weigh in when deciding whether to confront prejudice or not.
Such considerations can be induced in different ways, even by simply
priming aspects of moral courage. For example, people associate dif-
ferent moral behaviors with different moral prototypes (helping with
being caring, moral courage with being just, heroism with being brave).
Accordingly, an activation of a certain prototype (e.g., “just”, which is
associated with being fair, moral, truthful, honest) was shown to in-
crease the tendency for morally courageous behavior (Osswald,
Greitemeyer, Fischer, & Frey, 2010). Extending previous research, we
go beyond the moral priming effect to investigate the unique role that
moral loss and moral gain mindsets potentially plays in motivating
moral behavior, like confronting. According to our thinking, a person
with a loss mindset is likely to feel that by not confronting bias, he/she
can lose a sense of moral integrity. A person with a gain mindset is
likely to feel that by confronting, he/she will earn a sense of being a
more moral human being.
While both a moral loss and moral gain mindsets are related to one's
moral self-concept, they are also psychologically different and accord-
ingly may motivate confronting in different ways and for different
people. Corresponding to these two mindsets, self-regulatory focus
theory (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1997) distinguishes between
two motivational systems that regulate goal-directed behavior: a pro-
motion and a prevention focus. Promotion focus emphasizes advance-
ment and growth, with goals being viewed as ideals (Shah & Higgins,
1997). Prevention focus emphasizes safety, duties and responsibilities,
with goals being viewed as obligations. Those with promotion focus are
primarily concerned with the presence or absence of positive outcomes
(or end states), while those with prevention focus are concerned with
negative outcomes. Thus, promotion focus orients people toward pur-
suing opportunities, whereas prevention focus orients toward avoiding
errors (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes,
1994).
Messages that promote a moral gain mindset regarding confronting
(e.g., “intervening would reveal a good and moral side of me”) corre-
spond to a promotion focus to the extent that it emphasizes the op-
portunity of a positive moral end state if the person confronts racism.
Similarly, a moral loss mindset (e.g., “not intervening would reveal a
bad and immoral side of me”) corresponds to prevention focus to the
extent it orients people to avoid making an error and ending up with a
negative moral state if one fails to confront racism.
Research on regulatory focus suggests that under a prevention focus
people are likely to react more strongly to issues related to justice and
morality (Sassenberg & Hansen, 2007), especially if they are morally
committed to that particular goal. For example, when individuals were
primed with a prevention focus (wrote about what they felt they ought
to achieve in their working life), the more they held a moral conviction
about the fair treatment of their group, the more they supported
collective action against ingroup discrimination (Zaal, Laar, Ståhl,
Ellemers, & Derks, 2011). Researchers argued that because prevention-
orientation makes people construe goals such as those mandated by
moral conviction (in this case, fair treatment) as necessities (Scholer,
Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010; Shah & Higgins, 1997; Zaal,
Van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2012), they were, presumably,
particularly sensitive to the possible losses of inaction and were moti-
vated to avoid those. Meanwhile, for individuals primed with a pro-
motion focus (who wrote about what they would ideally like to achieve)
moral conviction did not predict collective action intentions (Zaal et al.,
2011). The researchers assumed that promotion-oriented individuals,
for whom expectations for success play a key role in taking action (Shah
& Higgins, 1997; Zaal et al., 2012) were likely doubtful regarding the
effectiveness of collective action. Thus, this work exemplifies how a loss
mindset and a gain mindset trigger a different set of concerns, resulting
in different actions.
Another study exploring the relationship between moral commit-
ment, regulatory focus and moral behavior found similar results
(Brebels, De Cremer, Van Dijke, & Van Hiel, 2011). Business students
were made to imagine being managers of a company, and their pro-
cedural justice intentions were assessed. Results revealed that partici-
pants for whom morality was a central part of their identity, exhibited
more procedural justice intentions under a prevention focus (manipu-
lated via priming a threat to the company's position in the market) than
under a promotion focus (manipulated via priming an opportunity to
advance the company's position; Brebels et al., 2011). One possible
explanation is that under a prevention focus, participants focused on
the possibility of feeling immoral (loss to moral identity), which they
were motivated to avoid. Those for whom moral identity was less im-
portant, showed the opposite pattern, i.e. more justice intention in
promotion than in prevention focus (Brebels et al., 2011). Perhaps
under a promotion focus they were made to think about how they could
potentially improve their moral identity by acting fairer.
Together, the work described above suggests that a loss mindset is
likely to promote intentions for moral behavior, particularly for those
who care about being moral. Applied to our context, this suggests that a
loss mindset can promote confronting among those highly committed to
non-prejudice, while potential gains might not. This notion echoes
prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991, 1992), according to
which losses inflict psychological harm to a greater degree than gains
gratify, which means that people are more willing to run risks to avoid
losses than to approach gains. Thus, the psychological costs of falling
short of one's moral self-concept should be a motivating force in con-
fronting racism for those who care about being non-prejudiced.
Nevertheless, a loss mindset is not likely to cause change in con-
fronting rate among those weakly committed to non-prejudice, because
they should perceive little threat to their non-prejudiced (moral) self-
concept as a result of not contesting racism. On the contrary, they might
even appraise a loss message as external pressure and obligation to
respond without prejudice and thus reduce their intention to confront
as a result of a backfire effect (Does, Derks, Ellemers, & Scheepers,
2012; Legault, Gutsell, & Inzlicht, 2011; Powell, Branscombe, &
Schmitt, 2005).
Meanwhile, a focus on gains to one's moral self-concept could drive
more confronting among those weakly committed to non-prejudice
because it is seen as an opportunity to improve moral self-regard
(Leary, 2007; Sedikides, 1993; Sedikides & Hepper, 2009). Such op-
portunity for moral self-improvement should play less of a role in
motivating confronting among those who already view themselves as
non-prejudiced. Additionally, under moral gain focus, those weakly
committed to non-prejudice may confront to gain moral credits pro-
spectively in the domain of racism (Cascio & Plant, 2015) – indeed,
prejudiced individuals show higher tendency than non-prejudiced in-
dividuals to license their biased/immoral behavior with prior unbiased/
moral behavior (Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009).
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1. The present research
Taken together, we predicted that participants' moral commitment
to non-prejudice would moderate the effects of moral mindset on con-
fronting racism. Specifically, a moral loss (vs. control) mindset would
significantly increase confronting tendencies among those strongly
morally committed to non-prejudice, but not among those weakly
committed (H1). We also predicted that a moral gain (vs. control)
mindset would drive confronting among those who are weakly com-
mitted to non-prejudice and would not affect those strongly committed
(H2).
We tested these hypotheses in two experiments. In the first, parti-
cipants were asked to picture themselves in specific racist scenarios, for
which confronting was framed in one of three ways: as moral loss, as
moral gain, or neither. Participants were asked to report their will-
ingness to confront. In the second study, participants were again ran-
domly assigned to either a loss mindset, a gain mindset, or an empty
control using a different manipulation that we considered to be possibly
more enduring. After a few days they went through a behavioral
paradigm where they witnessed racism and had an opportunity to
confront. By investigating whether moral mindsets increase con-
fronting, the present research allowed us to gain insight into different
motivations for confronting racism, which can in turn inform inter-
ventions aimed at promoting standing up against racism, as well as
against other forms of immoral behavior.
Based on the literature on regulatory focus and moral orientation
(Brebels et al., 2011; Zaal et al., 2011) we assessed participants' moral
commitment to non-prejudice with the moral identity self-importance
scale (Aquino & Reed II, 2002), which comprises two dimensions/
subscales (internalized vs. symbolized), and with the moral conviction
scale (Skitka & Morgan, 2014). Both were slightly altered to the pre-
judice domain. For an individual with a strong moral identity, moral
strivings are integrated with the self-concept and are central to a per-
son's self-definition (Aquino & Reed II, 2002). The internalized com-
ponent captures a personal and private aspect of moral self-concept and
the symbolized component captures the social and public aspect.
Higher scores on moral conviction capture individuals' strong and ab-
solute belief that something is wrong or right (Skitka, 2010).1 We are
unaware of previous work that tested these scales together, especially
not in the current context. We treated each of the scales (3 in total) as a
potential moderator of the predicted effects, and our research was ex-
ploratory as to under what condition and which morality orientation
would influence the relationship between loss/gain mindsets and con-
fronting.
2. Experiment 1
To provide initial support for our predictions, in this study we
manipulated moral mindset and measured the self-reported tendency to
confront racism. All participants were provided with two vignettes,
each depicting an instance of racism (one against a Spanish-speaking
boy and another against a Muslim woman, both placed in the US). They
were asked to imagine themselves as taking part in these situations,
namely, witnessing racism and having opportunity to confront. The
opportunity to confront (or not) was manipulated to involve potential
moral self-concept loss, moral self-concept gain or neither. In this latter
control group participants were exposed to the same scenarios, and to
the opportunity to confront, but no manipulation of loss or gain was
added. This enabled us to test the effect of loss and gain beyond a
morality priming effect. Then we asked participants about their will-
ingness to confront in the situations described. As hypothesized mod-
erating variables, participants responded to scales measuring the
strength of their moral commitment to non-prejudice.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants and procedure
We recruited 480 participants via Amazon's Mechanical Turk
(mTurk), who participated in an online study for monetary compen-
sation ($1.20). Power analysis revealed that to detect an (assumed)
small effect size (0.2) to achieve a power of at least 0.80 for a mod-
eration analysis (to calculate, we used F test ANOVA/interaction with 6
groups), the suggested sample size was 400 (G*Power 3.1; see Faul,
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Given that some participants might
be excluded based on attention checks, our collected sample size was
480. Participants were randomly assigned either to the moral loss,
moral gain or control group. Participants filled out the morality scales
and completed the vignette scenario measures. The materials were
counterbalanced such that the morality scales appeared either prior to,
or after, the manipulation. At the end of the study, participants re-
sponded to demographic questions (age, gender, education level, con-
servative–liberal orientation; relative socio-economic situation, see
Appendix A for full demographics), were debriefed and thanked for
their participation.
Data of participants who failed the attention check (which was
placed close to the morality scales, “For this question mark number
seven as a response”; n=33) were excluded, leaving 447 participants
for analyses (n=147 in loss, n=143 in gain, n=157 in control
condition; 47.3% female, 52.2% male, 0.5% other, Mage=36.38 years,
SDage=11.56).
2.1.2. Stimuli and measures
For all measures, participants responded on a 9-point scale ranging
from 1 (not at all true of me) to 9 (completely true of me) unless in-
dicated otherwise.
2.1.2.1. Moral conviction. We used the 4-item moral conviction scale
(Skitka & Morgan, 2014). To reflect conviction about prejudice we gave
participants the following instruction stem: “To what extent is your
position on standing up against prejudice and discrimination…”.
Participants then responded to the following four items: (1) “a
reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions?” (2) “connected
to your beliefs about fundamental right and wrong?” (3) “based on
moral principle?”, and (4) “a moral stance?” Mean scores on these items
were calculated for each participant composing an internally consistent
scale (α=0.94). Higher scores indicated higher levels of moral
conviction against prejudice.
2.1.2.2. Moral–prejudice identity. We used the moral identity (MID)
self-importance scale (Aquino & Reed II, 2002) and adapted it to the
current context by revising the scale instruction to refer to non-
prejudiced values and by excluding one item that did not fit the
current context. For the MID internalization subscale participants
responded to 5 items, such as “Being someone who has these views
and beliefs [being non-prejudiced] is an important part of who I am”
(α=0.83). For the MID symbolization subscale participants responded
to 4 items, such as “The fact that I have these views and beliefs [being
non-prejudiced] is communicated to others by my membership in
certain organizations” (α=0.92, see Appendix B for full scales).
2.1.2.3. Vignette scenarios and confronting intentions. The scenarios and
1 In addition, we included a measure that intended to capture the strength of
one's general moral ought vs. ideal orientation (which reflects the tendency to
avoid moral failure vs. approach moral ideals, respectively; Aoki, 2015) in
order to demonstrate that the predicted mechanisms are specific to moral stance
about prejudice and not to general morality. Given that the outcome measure
was specific to intergroup situations involving confronting prejudice, we did
not expect general moral orientation to moderate the effects. Results supported
this expectation. In both studies, we also included an SDO and IMS-EMS scale
for exploratory purposes. See Supplementary material for further details on all
of these additional scales.
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measures were developed for the purpose of the current study. All
participants were presented with the same two scenarios (the order of
the two scenarios was counterbalanced). In scenario A, the participant
had to imagine that she or he witnesses a man verbally assaulting a
Spanish-speaking teenage boy on the bus and expressing his dislike of
immigrants (see Appendix C for full texts). In scenario B, the participant
allegedly overheard his or her co-workers making fun of their Muslim
female co-worker for her religion.
For each scenario, we mentioned a dilemma and asked participants
to imagine the pro's (e.g., “you believe that this specific boy is treated
unfairly, you are debating whether to intervene or not”) and con's of
confronting (e.g., “if you get involved, the man may verbally or even
physically attack you”). Until this point all participants read the same
scenario. The manipulation of moral loss vs. gain was communicated at
the end of this text. Specifically, in the loss condition, additional ar-
guments referring to moral considerations framed around losses were
presented (e.g., “You feel it is your moral obligation to intervene. If you
don't intervene, you fail your moral duty, and you may later feel like a
worse person morally. You feel you can lose a lot if you don't con-
front.”). In the gain condition the additional arguments referred to a
moral gain (e.g., “You feel it is your moral aspiration to intervene. If
you intervene, you succeed to live up to your moral principles, and you
may later feel like a better person morally. You feel you can gain a lot if
you confront.”). In order to encourage participants to carefully read the
scenarios we included an open-ended question under each scenario,
which read: “Based on the text, what are the considerations in the de-
cision to intervene?”. Responses to this question were not analyzed.
Following each scenario, all participants were asked about their
confronting intentions: First, we measured willingness to engage in
specific confronting actions with six items rated on a 9-point scale (from
1=not likely at all to 9= very much likely), such as “I would confront
the man and tell him he is racist.” or “I would ask the man to stop
assaulting the boy.” (scenario A) and “I would tell my supervisor about
my co-workers' conversation” or “I would ask my co-workers to stop
insulting her” (scenario B; see Appendix C for full measure).2 Then, for
each scenario, we also included an item assessing overall confronting
willingness: “Overall, to what extent you would confront in this situa-
tion in order to [help the boy/stand up for her?]” on a 9-point scale
from 1= I would not confront at all to 9= I would totally confront.
Given that people may vary in the form of confronting they choose to
take, and a participant may prefer one way of confronting very much
while not at all another, we extracted the highest score each participant
gave across the 6 items for each scenario (reverse coded the non-con-
fronting option items). This way, we captured the greatest tendency to
confront, for each participant. The two values (maximum value from
each scenario) were then averaged with the overall general confronting
scores (2 for each scenario) given by each participant. These four
numbers formed an internally consistent ‘confronting intentions’ mea-
sure (α=0.75).
Following the vignette scenarios and intention measure, we asked
participants in the loss and gain experimental conditions to indicate
“Which of the following is closer to what was suggested in the texts
about feelings and morality?” Answer options were either 1 = “After
confronting, people may feel better and gain positive moral identity”
(indicating moral gain) or 2 = “After not confronting, people may feel
worse and loose positive moral identity” (indicating moral loss). We
considered this a manipulation check.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Preliminary analyses
Using One-way ANOVA and post-hoc tests we did not find sig-
nificant differences between conditions on demographic variables,
p's > .14 (see Table 1 for means, standard deviations and correlations
between study variables). However, there were significant differences
between conditions on the moral conviction scale (loss vs. control:
p= .019, gain vs. control: p= .004), F(2,444)= 4.74, p=009. There
were no significant differences on the MID-symbolization scale (loss vs.
gain: p= .075, gain vs. control: p > .25; F(2,444)= 1.66, p > .19),
nor on the MID internalization scale (p's > .10; F(2,444)= 1.58,
p > .20). We also tested whether the order of study materials had an
effect on confronting intentions or on the morality scales and found
non-significant differences (p's < .12). In addition, we tested and
found no significant two-way interactions between order and condition
(loss vs. gain vs. control) on confronting intentions (p > .25) or on the
morality scales (p= .093 for MID-symbolization, otherwise p's >
.25).3 Given these results we nonetheless decided to control for order as
a covariate in our main analyses.
As a next step, we tested the manipulation check item. As intended,
we found that in the loss condition, significantly more participants
chose the loss response (“… people may feel worse and loose positive
moral identity”; 66.2%) over the gain response, and in the gain con-
dition, significantly more participants indicated the gain response over
the loss response (“… people may feel better and gain positive moral
identity”; 91.5%); χ2 (1)= 98.96, p < .001, Cramer's V=0.60.
2.2.2. Main analyses
In order to analyze the effects of a loss mindset (vs. control) and of a
gain mindset (vs. control) on confronting intentions as a function of
participants' moral commitment to non-prejudice, we ran a moderation
analyses for a multicategorical IV (Hayes, 2018). The analysis involved
two dummy variables as independent variables: D1 (1= loss and
0= control and gain) and D2 (1= gain and 0= control and loss). The
morality scales, namely, moral conviction, MID-internalization and
MID-symbolization were tested as moderators, each in a separate
model. Variables were not z-standardized or centered. As indicated
before, we controlled for order of study materials (as covariate) in all
three moderation analyses.
In the analysis where moral conviction was tested as a moderator,
the two-way interaction between D1 (loss vs. control) and moral con-
viction on confronting intentions was not significant (p= .057; see
Table 2 for statistics for the interactions as well as the conditional main
effects of both dummy variables and morality scales). Simple effects
revealed that the loss mindset affected only those who were high on
moral conviction (1 SD above the mean), such that it increased con-
fronting intentions (M=7.99) compared to the control condition
(M=7.48), b=0.52, SE=0.25, t=2.11, p = .035, 95% CI [0.04,
1.00] (see Fig. 1). For those weakly morally convicted (1 SD below
mean), this effect was not significant (p > .25).
The MID symbolization and internalization subscale did not mod-
erate the relationship between loss (vs. control) mindset and con-
fronting (p's > .25), and simple effects were also not significant
(p's > .25). Additionally, there were no significant two-way interac-
tions between D2 (gain vs. control) and any of the moral commitment
scales (p's > .25; and simple effects were also non-significant, p's >
.25). (See Table S1 in Supplementary material for estimated condi-
tional means and simple effects for confronting intentions as a factor of
condition and all moral commitment to non-prejudice scales).
2 As the seventh item on these blocks we put: “other suggestion (not man-
datory, if you don't write, just mark 1): _________ (text entry)”. To avoid an-
choring, we did not write an item, which would describe an action in agreement
with the racist perpetrator (i.e., insulting the boy or the female co-worker). We
included this item to provide an opportunity for participants to express this
sentiment if they wished. We did not analyze these responses or considered
scores on this item in data analyses.
3 The three-way interaction between order, condition (loss vs. gain vs. con-
trol), moral commitment to non-prejudice scales (analyzed separately) on
confronting were not significant either (p's > .25).
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2.3. Discussion
In Experiment 1, we found partial support for the idea that a moral
mindset induction can increase levels of confronting racism. Consistent
with our prediction (H1), we found that the moral loss framing, com-
pared to a control, triggered more willingness to confront racism among
those who were high on moral commitment to non-prejudice, specifi-
cally on moral conviction. There was no significant effect among those
who were weakly convicted. The interaction, nevertheless, was not
significant, p= .057, and these effects occurred with only one out of
three potential moderators (the MID subscales did not have an influence
on the relationship between loss mindset and confronting).
Furthermore, we failed to find evidence for our second prediction
(H2) regarding gain mindset. We found that confronting rate in the
moral gain condition did not significantly differ from the control con-
dition, at any level of moral conviction or MID-symbolization or MID-
internalization. It could be the case that the gain manipulation was not
effective because, overall, our moral mindset priming was subtle and
perhaps not sufficiently persuasive. In the next study, we created and
tested an engaging and distinctive moral mindset intervention. We are
also not sure whether participants perceived the vignette situations as
depicting prejudice given that we did not have a proper measure to
assess that. Additionally, we measured (hypothetical) willingness to
confront racism and not actual behavior. Once participants need to
make an (allegedly) real decision to confront, a different pattern of
Table 1
Means (standard deviations) and correlations between study variables in Experiment 1.
M (SD) Confronting intentions Moral conviction MID-internal MID-symbol Conservative–liberal SES Education Age
Confronting intentions 7.02 (1.63) –
Moral conviction 7.29 (1.76) 0.43⁎⁎ –
MID-internal 7.33 (1.67) 0.26⁎⁎ 0.53⁎⁎ –
MID-symbol 5.28 (2.23) 0.29⁎⁎ 0.37⁎⁎ 0.31⁎⁎ –
Conservative–liberal 6.29 (2.96) 0.18⁎⁎ 0.21⁎⁎ 0.25⁎⁎ 0.06 –
SES 3.40 (1.01) 0.11⁎⁎ 0.04 −0.13⁎⁎ 0.18⁎⁎ −0.14⁎⁎ –
Education 2.79 (0.73) 0.11⁎ −0.005 −0.05 0.12⁎ 0.05 0.30⁎⁎ –
Age 36.38 (11.56) −0.03 0.10⁎ 0.19⁎⁎ 0.01 −0.10⁎ −0.16⁎⁎ 0.07 –
Confronting intentions, moral conviction, and MID's were on a 9-point continuous scale. Conservative-liberal dimension was on a continuous slider from 0 (con-
servative) to 10 (liberal). SES was on 6-point and education was on a 5-point ordinal scales.
Note.
⁎ p < .05.
⁎⁎ p < .01.
Table 2
The effect of moral mindset condition (control, loss, gain) on confronting intentions as a factor of moral commitment to non-prejudiced scales (controlling for order)
in Experiment 1.
Moderator Predictor Confronting intentions
B (SE) t p-Value 95% CI
Moral conviction Moral conviction 0.30 (0.08) 3.80 .00 0.15; 0.46
D1 (control vs. loss) −1.34 (0.82) −1.63 .10 −2.96; 0.28
D2 (control vs. gain) −0.56 (0.77) −0.73 .47 −2.06; 0.94
D1 x moral conviction 0.21 (0.11) 1.91 .06 −0.01; 0.42
D2 x moral conviction 0.09 (0.10) 0.85 .39 −0.11; 0.28
Order 0.06 (0.16) 0.37 .71 −0.25; 0.37
MID-symbol MID-symbol 0.24 (0.06) 4.02 .00 0.12; 0.36
D1 (control vs. loss) 0.41 (0.50) 0.82 .41 −0.57; 1.39
D2 (control vs. gain) −0.06 (0.47) −0.12 .91 −0.97; 0.86
D1 x MID-symbol −0.09 (0.09) −1.04 .30 −0.26; 0.08
D2 x MID-symbol −0.01 (0.08) −0.11 .91 −0.17; 0.15
Order 0.02 (0.17) 0.10 .92 −0.31; 0.34
MID-internal MID-internal 0.27 (0.07) 3.77 .00 0.13; 0.42
D1 (control vs. loss) 0.17 (0.86) 0.20 .84 −1.51; 1.86
D2 (control vs. gain) 0.42 (0.80) 0.52 .60 −1.16; 2.00
D1 x MID-internal −0.02 (0.11) −0.20 .84 −0.24; 0.20
D2 x MID-internal −0.07 (0.11) −0.62 .54 −0.28; 0.14
































Fig. 1. Interaction between mindset framing condition (loss vs. gain vs. control)
and participants' moral conviction on confronting intentions (on a 9-point
scale).
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results may emerge (Crosby & Wilson, 2015). To overcome these lim-
itations of the confronting measure, in Experiment 2, we employed a
behavioral test of confronting racism, where participants believed that
they were actually witnessing blatant prejudice and had an opportunity
to contest it.
3. Experiment 2
Experiment 2 involved an online intervention we designed to induce
a moral loss vs. gain moral mindset. We further developed a behavioral
paradigm to measure actual confronting behavior. Participants first
filled out the scales of moral commitment to non-prejudice (same as
those in Experiment 1). Then they were randomly assigned either to a
moral loss or moral gain mindset intervention, or to an empty control
condition. After a couple of days, we approached the same participants
with a study allegedly pre-testing a behavioral economics game (which
actually included the confronting measure). Participants believed that
they were observing a game involving other participants. During the
game, they witnessed a player being prejudiced and discriminating
against an outgroup member (a Muslim individual) and had an op-
portunity to respond and thereby confront the racist player. Testing
actual confronting allowed us to potentially capture real-life behavior.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants and procedure
We recruited 450 U.S. residents through mTurk to complete the first
part of the study for monetary compensation ($1.50). We ended up with
two additional respondents, which is not unusual with mTurk. A-priori
power analysis (G*Power 3.1; see Faul et al., 2009) for logistic re-
gression (probabilities set to 0.25 and 0.15; R-squared other
X= 0.50^1) revealed that a sample size of 247 is needed to achieve
sufficient power of 0.80. Considering attrition and the exclusion criteria
(attention and suspicion check), we collected 450 participants in the
first part. In the survey, participants first completed the morality scales,
then they were randomly assigned to a moral loss or moral gain mindset
induction, or empty control condition (in which they completed the
morality scales but were not exposed to any mindset related stimuli).
This part of the study ended with demographic questions (age, gender,
SES, education level, liberal-conservative orientations, race/ethnicity and
religion. See Appendix A for full demographics).
Two days later, all respondents received a notification email ad-
vertising a new study (allegedly pre-testing a behavioral economics
game). This email came from a different mTurk account in order to
disguise that the studies were connected.4 Only two respondents who
identified as Muslim in the first part of the study were not invited back
to due to ethical considerations (risk of psychological harm). Following
our email advertising the new study, we left the study open for 5 days to
collect responses. With a 34% dropout rate, 297 respondents returned
and went through the confronting measure. Data of participants who
failed the attention check in the first part (same 1 item as in Experiment
1, n =27, 9.1% of sample) or expressed suspicion about the game sti-
muli5 (n=10, 3.4% of sample) were excluded from data analyses,
leaving 260 participants in the study (n =82 in loss, n=78 in gain,
n=100 in control condition6; 44.6% female, Mage=36.08,
SDage=10.27).
After completing the study, we messaged all participants for de-
briefing. We revealed to them the study purpose (how people react to
uncomfortable intergroup situations, such as witnessing racism), the
deception (that no racism had occurred as the game was pre-pro-
grammed), we reassured them the study was anonymous, and we pro-
vided them with our email address for further assistance.
3.1.2. Materials and measures
We included the same morality scales, moral conviction (4 items,
α= 0.94), MID internalization (5 items, α=0.84) and MID symboli-
zation scales (4 items, α=0.89) as in Experiment 1. The rest of the
materials are described below.
3.1.2.1. Intervention stimuli. In the loss and gain conditions,
participants were told that they would be asked to complete three
tasks (see Appendix D for full material). Each of the tasks was aimed to
induce a loss or gain mindset with respect to failure to confront
immoral behavior (one task was general, the other two were specific
to racism). In the first task a poster appeared depicting a bystander
situation (someone being physically attacked while others around do
nothing) with a text either framed as moral loss (“Not getting involved
sometimes means you are risking to behave immorally”) vs. gain (“Not
getting involved sometimes means you are missing a chance to behave
morally”), based on condition. Participants were asked to write what
they thought the poster meant. In the next task, participants were
shown a video of a real event, depicting a British woman insulting
immigrants on a bus, and then a text described a bystander passenger,
who later allegedly reported his regrets of not confronting. Participants
were asked to give a short account of their thoughts and feelings while
imagining they are this passenger. The provided text box started with a
stem sentence, which was framed according to condition (moral loss: “I
feel like not intervening revealed a bad side of me…” vs. moral gain: “I
feel like intervening would have revealed a good side of me…”). In the
last task, a text described a Holocaust rescuer and an alleged account he
gave about his actions, which was framed according to condition (moral
loss: “…He once noted that not doing what he did would have cost him
his moral virtue and he would have felt like a bad person…” vs. moral
gain: “…He once noted that through this action he gained moral virtue
and he feels he became a better person for doing it….”). Then
participants were asked to describe this person's potential thoughts
and feelings about his own behavior.
Similar to Experiment 1, for a manipulation check, on a separate
page we asked participants in the two experimental conditions the
following questions: “What is suggested in the previous tasks about
people's feeling and morality if they do not intervene in those situa-
tions? (pick the convenient sentence starter and continue the sen-
tence)”. Answer options were 1 = “they miss a chance to gain…. (text
entry)”, or 2 = “They risk to lose… (text entry)”. The chosen option
enabled us to assess whether we succeeded to prime a gain or loss
mindset (we did not analyze how they completed the sentence).
3.1.2.2. Confronting stimuli. We developed the current “Trust Game”
paradigm for the purpose of our research program on confronting
racism. We used and altered the “Trust Game” (Berg, Dickhaut, &
McCabe, 1995; Charness & Rabin, 2002), where Player A decides how
much money out of an initial endowment to send to another subject,
Player B. The sent amount is then multiplied by 3 and Player B decides
4We contacted participants and collected data through an mTurk extension
website called TurkPrime (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016). We as re-
searchers did not handle participants' identifying information such as their
email address, we solely used their anonymized ID's.
5We screened for suspicion about the realness of the game based on parti-
cipants' messages to the alleged player they were observing (whether the par-
ticipant asked or stated if the player is “real”/“bot”) and based on an open-
ended question at the end of study (“Please feel free to leave any comment/s or
remark/s you may have.”; whether participants wrote that the game was fab-
ricated and/or that the racist remark was the actual aim of the study). Note that
no participant made a comment that would lead us to believe that they figured
out that the two parts were connected.
6 There are more participants in the empty control condition than in the loss
and gain conditions most likely because more respondents started these con-
ditions without finishing it than respondents in the control (which was a shorter
survey), but Qualtrics still calculated it toward equal randomization.
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how much of the money received to send back to Player A. To conceal
the purpose of the study, participants were told that we are testing how
observing influences trusting behavior and how does gender (of the
players and observers) influence trusting behavior. Participants were
given instructions on the game (see Appendix E) and they were
“trained” on the rules. They were told that they would first be
assigned to a player and observe his/her rounds and only after they
would play this game themselves for money. Participants were further
explained that this player they observe could initiate private messaging
with them. Allegedly this was enabled in order for the “observer” to feel
more real to the player, in reality this was done in order to manipulate
racism and enable confronting. In order to strengthen our cover story,
we asked participants not to share the purpose of the study with the
players while they were messaging.
Participants then entered a different site to observe the game (in
reality the game observed was pre-programmed). To make participants
feel present in the situation we asked them to provide their nickname as
well (they appeared with this throughout the game). All participants
were assigned to observe a player called Mark, and then observed two
decoy rounds and exchanged some messages with Mark (in these
messages Mark addressed the participant by their nickname and his
responses were written to fit any message the participant replied with).
In the first observed round Mark played against Kip and gave half of his
money, then against Nica and gave all of his money (both partners
returned the money fairly). Then, Mark's partner appeared as Hakim (a
Muslim name), and to him Mark decided to give no money. Then, Mark
privately messaged the participant saying: “You can't trust those damn
Muslims” (see Fig. 2a and b for scenes from the game). Participants thus
witnessed a discriminatory act and an explicitly racist comment. Be-
neath the message, participants had a chance to either press ‘continue
game’ or ‘reply’. Then, for all participants a message appeared on the
screen indicating that there was a problem registered in the system, and
the game terminated.
3.1.2.3. Confronting. Participants who chose to continue the game, or
to reply but left the message box empty, or those who responded in a
non-confronting way - were all labeled as ‘not confronting’ and coded as
‘0’. Responses that questioned or reproached the player for his behavior
and statement were labeled as ‘confronting’ and coded as ‘1’. Responses
that are unclear as to their intentions (confronting or not) were coded
as other and treated as missing values in the main analyses (as indicated
in the participants section part, those who communicated suspicion
here about the study were excluded from analyses). These responses
were coded by two authors of the manuscript blind to conditions, and
disagreements (n=3) were discussed.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Preliminary analysis
First, we tested and found no significant differences across condi-
tions on the morality scales, p's > .17, or on demographics, p's > .22
(see Table 3 for means, standard deviations and correlations between
study variables). We found that the mindset manipulation was suc-
cessful in communicating the sense of moral loss vs. gain, χ2
(1)= 37.95, p < .001, Cramer's V= 0.49. Specifically, significantly
more people indicated the loss (vs. gain) response in the loss condition
(76.8%), and significantly more participants indicated the gain (vs.
loss) response in the gain condition (71.8%).
Next, we analyzed the responses of the confronting message.
Considering all conditions, we found that 120 participants pressed to
continue the game (were thus coded as not confronting, ‘0’), 140
pressed to reply. Among repliers, 108 participants (41.5% of all parti-
cipants) confronted the racist perpetrator (coded as confronting, ‘1’), 19
people wrote messages that expressed consent or simple acknowl-
edgment (e.g., “OK”) (they were all coded as not confronting, ‘0’), and
13 responses were ambiguous and thus coded as ‘other’ and were not
used for data analyses.
3.2.2. Main analyses
Analysis strategy was the same as in Experiment 1, except this time
we ran logistic regression because our DV was dichotomous (con-
fronting or not). As indicated in Table 4, there was a significant two-
way interaction between D1 (loss vs. control) and MID-symbolization
on confronting intentions. A simple-effects analysis revealed that the
loss mindset affected only those who were high on MID-symbolization
(1 SD above the mean), such that it increased confronting intentions
(prob. = 0.56, odds= 1.27) compared to the control condition (prob.
= 0.30, odds= 0.43), b=1.10, SE=0.46, Z=2.37, OR=0.34,
p= .018, 95% CI [0.19; 2.01] (see Fig. 3). This effect was not sig-
nificant among those weakly committed (1 SD below mean; p > .25).
Other morality scales (MID internalization and moral conviction)
did not moderate the relationship between loss (vs. control) and con-
fronting (p's > .25), and simple effects were also not significant
(p's > .24). Additionally, there were no significant two-way interac-
tions between D2 (gain vs. control) and any of the moral commitment
scales (p's > .10), nor significant simple effects (p's > .14). (See Table
S2 in Supplementary material for probabilities and simple effects for
confronting as a factor of condition and moral commitment to non-
prejudice scales.)
3.3. Discussion
In Experiment 2, we developed and tested an online moral mindset
intervention and a couple of days later employed an online behavioral
paradigm to measure real acts of confronting racism. We found partial
support for our prediction (H1) that a moral loss mindset can increase
confronting of racism among those high in moral commitment to non-
prejudice. Nevertheless, also in Experiment 2 the effect emerged only
with one out of the three considered moderators, and, unlike in
Experiment 1, in this study a MID subscale (symbolization) moderated
the effect of moral loss mindset on confronting (and not moral con-
viction). We discuss potential reasons for this inconsistency in detail in
the general discussion. As in Experiment 1, confronting rate was not
significantly affected by the gain mindset (vs. control) at any level of
moral commitment. We address the lack of support for our expectation
in this respect (H2) in the general discussion.
Interestingly, MID-symbolization seemed to have a negative re-
lationship with confronting. Specifically, in the control group, con-
fronting tended to be higher among those low in MID-symbolization
compared to those higher on this scale. Note that this scale asked about
the respondents' behavioral commitment to non-prejudice in everyday
life, about their hobbies, activities, memberships in organizations that
reflect these values. Those high on symbolization are usually driven to
publicly exhibit their moral self, and they are motivated by recognition
and reputational gains from engagement in moral deeds (Winterich,
Aquino, Mittal, & Swartz, 2013; Winterich, Mittal, & Aquino, 2013). It
could be the case that participants high on this measure felt excused
from confronting because their public activities provided them with
Fig. 2. Scenes from the game: (a) the observed player/Mark was playing
against a Muslim player (Hakim) and decided to give him no money. The ob-
server/participant was indicated to be present, and (b) the observed player/
Mark messaged the participant with his prejudiced remark about Muslims.
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moral credentials (see Monin & Miller, 2001). This might have not been
the case for those who had no such credentials (i.e., low on MID-sym-
bolization). Thus, what the loss mindset intervention possibly did, is
that it induced individuals high on MID-symbolization to think about
losing these moral credits, thereby motivating their confronting. Put
differently, it is possible that the moral loss mindset acted as a buffer to
this general moral licensing process.
Finally, we should point out that our manipulation check, assessing
the extent to which we succeeded to communicate a loss/gain mindset
was limited because it did not involve a comparison with the control
condition. In the manipulation check we asked: “What is suggested in
the previous tasks about people's feeling and morality if they do not
intervene in those situations?”. Answer options were either “they miss a
chance to gain… (text entry)”, or “they risk to lose… (text entry)”. This
manipulation check question would have not made sense to participants
in the empty control condition because they were not exposed to any
tasks.
4. General discussion
People who intervene in times of racial and ethnic discrimination
often describe their actions as driven by a need to avoid a sense of
moral failure. Holocaust rescuers often explained their decision to help
along the line of “Can I live with myself if I say no?” (Fogelman, n.d.).
Similarly, in the example of protest against deportation, Ersson herself
said in an interview, “I knew that I couldn't back down because it was
my name that was on the ticket. I had to do what I could”. In the present
research, we found evidence that this sense of moral failure can indeed
motivate people to confront racism. Across two studies, we tested the
effects of thinking about moral loss and moral gain on contesting racism
in light of people's non-prejudice moral commitment. In Experiment 1,
Table 3
Percentages or means and standard deviations (M and SD) and correlations between study variables in Experiment 2.
M (SD) Confronting (0: not, 1: yes) Moral conviction MID-internal MID-symbol Conservative–liberal SES Education Age
Confronting (0: not, 1: yes) 56.3%, 43.7% –
Moral conviction 7.39 (1.67) 0.16⁎ –
MID-internal 7.33 (1.68) 0.21⁎⁎ 0.52⁎⁎ –
MID-symbol 5.87 (1.97) −0.03 0.31⁎⁎ 0.19⁎⁎ –
Conservative–liberal 6.38 (3.11) 0.11 0.24⁎⁎ 0.14⁎⁎ −0.01 –
SES 3.45 (0.96) −0.12 −0.02 −0.25⁎⁎ 0.19⁎⁎ −0.10 –
Education 2.81 (0.70) −0.06 −0.07 −0.18⁎⁎ 0.06 −0.05 0.34⁎⁎ –
Age 36.08 (10.27) 0.15⁎ 0.11 0.22⁎⁎ −0.01 −0.08 −0.07 0.10 –
Moral conviction and MID scales were on a 9-point continuous scale. Conservative-liberal dimension was on a continuous slider from 0 (conservative) to 10 (liberal).
SES was on 6-point and education was on a 5-point ordinal scales.
Note.
⁎ p < .05.
⁎⁎ p < .01.
Table 4
The effect of moral mindset condition (loss, gain, control) on confronting behavior (0: not confronting, 1: confronting) as a factor of the moral commitment to non-
prejudiced scales in Experiment 2.
Moderator Predictor Confronting behavior
B (SE) Z p-Value 95% CI
Moral conviction Moral conviction 0.21 (0.15) 1.36 0.18 −0.09; 0.51
D1 (control vs. loss) −0.38 (1.66) −0.23 0.82 −3.63; 2.88
D2 (control vs. gain) 0.66 (1.59) 0.42 0.68 −2.44; 3.77
D1 x moral conviction 0.10 (0.22) 0.47 0.64 −0.32; 0.53
D2 x moral conviction −0.08 (0.21) −0.37 0.71 −0.48; 0.33
MID-symbol MID-symbol −0.20 (0.10) −2.01 0.05 −0.39; −0.01
D1 (control vs. loss) −1.76 (1.02) −1.72 0.09 −3.76; 0.25
D2 (control vs. gain) −1.43 (1.01) −1.41 0.16 −3.41; 0.56
D1 x MID-symbol 0.37 (0.17) 2.18 0.03 0.04; 0.70
D2 x MID-symbol 0.27 (0.16) 1.65 0.10 −0.05; 0.59
MID-internal MID-internal 0.23 (0.14) 1.65 0.10 −0.04; 0.51
D1 (control vs. loss) 0.02 (1.58) 0.01 0.99 −3.08; 3.12
D2 (control vs. gain) −0.75 (1.64) −0.45 0.65 −3.97; 2.47
D1 x MID-internal 0.05 (0.21) 0.23 0.82 −0.36; 0.45


























Fig. 3. Interaction between mindset framing condition (loss vs. gain vs. control)
and participants' MID-symbolization on confronting (yes or no; visualizing
probabilities).
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participants were presented with vignettes depicting racist scenarios,
where we varied the description of potential moral concerns (loss vs.
gain vs. control) and assessed participants' self-reported intentions to
confront the racist act. In Experiment 2, participants went through a
moral mindset intervention (that was intended to induce a loss or gain
mindset), or empty control, and a few days later, we employed a be-
havioral paradigm to measure real action to confront racism.
The studies provide partial support to our predictions. First, we
failed to find support for the hypothesis regarding the moral gain
mindset (H2). This mindset did not seem to be effective in increasing
confronting rate in comparison to the control group at any level of
moral commitment to non-prejudice. Regarding our other hypothesis
(H1), we predicted and found partial evidence that moral framing can
affect the tendency to confront racism, and this is dependent on parti-
cipants' non-prejudiced moral commitment. Across studies, among
those with high moral commitment to non-prejudice, a loss mindset led
to more confronting, compared to the control condition (H1). Likely,
the loss framing activated motivation to safeguard one's moral non-
prejudiced self-concept (Dutton & Lennox, 1974; Monteith, 1993).
However, in each of the studies a different variable moderated the ef-
fect. In Experiment 1, the moral conviction about prejudice scale
(adapted from Skitka & Morgan, 2014) moderated the effect of loss
mindset (vs. control) on confronting (although the interaction was not
significant, only the relevant simple effect), while in Experiment 2 it
was the symbolization facet of the moral identity-prejudice scale
(adapted from Aquino & Reed II, 2002) that significantly moderated
these effects. We employed these scales and we did not have specific
prediction as to (when and) which moral commitment construct would
have influence on the relationship between moral gain/loss mindsets
and confronting.
Due to these different moderation effects, our study findings may be
incidental (and reflect false positive results), and thus attempts of re-
plication are advisable in the future. However, there were notable
differences between the two studies that may account for the differing
effects of the morality scales. Namely, the manipulation in Experiment
1 involved an imagined scenario that focused on the victim of pre-
judice, and the participant was not the actual person in the described
situation who had the responsibility to confront. In Experiment 2, the
prejudiced situation was perceived as real (and not hypothetical),
making the participants believe they had to make an actual choice to
confront or not, rendering less focus on the harm done to the victims
and more focus on the responsibility and actions of the participant.
Correspondingly, those high on MID-symbolization are usually driven
to publicly exhibit their moral self, and they are motivated by re-
cognition and reputational gains from engagement in moral behavior
(Schaumberg & Wiltermuth, 2014; Winterich, Aquino, et al., 2013;
Winterich, Mittal, & Aquino, 2013). Thus, in Experiment 2, it was those
high on MID-symbolization who became encouraged to confront, per-
haps because they felt personally involved in the (allegedly) real-life
situation and under loss induction they felt that their own moral public
identity and reputation is at risk. Even more so if they thought that
others may see their actions such as the perpetrator, other players, or
the experimenter.
In the same time, compared to MID-symbolization, moral conviction
is a relatively other-oriented moral attitude given that it reflects in-
ternally entrenched beliefs (Skitka, 2010; Skitka, 2014; Skitka, Bauman,
& Sargis, 2005), which likely renders more focus on the actual subject
of this strongly held belief, in our case on the target of prejudice. Ac-
cordingly, we speculate that in Experiment 1 where there was a
stronger focus on the victims of prejudice, the moral loss induction
could trigger specifically those high on moral conviction to confront.
Having said that, to our knowledge no prior research have tested or
discussed these moral constructs in the same work, therefore our out-
lined theoretical distinction was speculative. The current explanations
to why different morality constructs pertained more to confronting
under differing situational cues warrants further investigation as in the
current research we are unable to answer that.
While the empirical evidence to our proposed effect is limited, we
offer an important initial step toward investigating the understudied
effect of anticipated moral cost on not confronting prejudice. Our
findings partially align with research on regulatory focus, which in-
dicates that individuals under prevention focus (corresponding to the
loss mindset) are more likely to engage in action aimed at amending
injustice directed toward their own group, than those in a control
group, and this is not the case for those under promotion focus (cor-
responding to a gain mindset; e.g., Sassenberg & Hansen, 2007; Zaal
et al., 2012). This effect is more pronounced if individuals hold a strong
moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group (Zaal et al.,
2011). We found consistent pattern in the domain of morality in the
context of third-party intervention, showing that those induced to think
in terms of a loss to their morality, were more likely to confront that
those in a control condition, if they were committed to non-prejudice.
For people with promotion focus, taking action depends heavily on
the (perceived) instrumentality of the action, i.e., on the expectation of
success (Shah & Higgins, 1997). Therefore, trying to motivate action
through reframing the action's moral goal in promotion-oriented terms
would only be effective when the likelihood that the action will succeed
is high (Quinn & Olson, 2011; Zaal et al., 2012). In our studies, the way
we framed the moral gain mindset did suggest that if the individual
does confront, he or she would likely succeed in gaining a positive and
moral self-regard. At the same time, we did not (necessarily) commu-
nicate that confronting will be successful in for example, changing the
perpetrator's mind or in helping the victim. This is possibly why we did
not find the gain mindset affecting confrontation of racism.
Our findings also reflect, to some extent, the loss aversion effect,
which states that losses inflict psychological harm to a greater degree
than gains gratify (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991, 1992). However, when
people witness racism and contemplate whether to confront, the po-
tential moral self-concept loss may not actually (psychologically) equal
the potential gain. Prospect theory was, for the most part, applied to
constructs (such as monetary investment) that can be readily quanti-
fied. Individuals' relation to their own moral self-concept is not ne-
cessarily the same as relations to their material possessions. Thus, the
extent to which we can apply loss aversion theory to the current in-
tergroup context is debatable.
Our findings however cannot be explained by a moral priming ef-
fect, whereby activating certain aspects of morality in memory (e.g., a
just prototype; Osswald et al., 2010) increases morally courageous be-
havior. For one, in both studies, all participants (including those in the
control group) responded to scales that were explicitly about morality.
Secondly, in Experiment 1, participants in the control group read the
same vignettes that included the prejudicial situation, the opportunity
and the pro and con concerns of intervening (while moral gain and loss
arguments were not mentioned). Finally, our results showed that the
gain mindset manipulation did not influence confronting, and moral
commitment moderated only the effects for the loss mindset – rendering
it unlikely that priming, or experimental demands can explain our
findings.
In general, when it comes to the question of witnessing racism, lay
and empirical discussion is usually focused on the personal costs of
confronting. Namely, on people's courage to stand up against injustice
despite the anticipation of substantial costs to themselves. Such sacri-
fices are without question admirable and should be recognized.
Nevertheless, not much is being said about the personal benefits of
confronting, or more correctly, about the personal moral costs of not
confronting. The present work sheds light on this perspective, by
showing that when one cares about being non-prejudiced, the potential
loss of one's sense of morality if action is not taken can actually trigger
confronting behavior.
Given that confronting in our studies was influenced by the person's
consideration about their own morality, and not only about standing up
for the victims, can we still consider it a morally courageous behavior?
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This resonates with the age old question about the nature and existence
of selfless good deeds (Kant, 1785; Nietzsche, 1878), and whether if an
individual benefits from their prosocial behavior is that act ultimately
egoistic (self-oriented; Andreoni, 1990) or it may nonetheless be con-
sidered courageous and altruistic (other-oriented; Batson, 2011; Batson
& Shaw, 1991). This remains an unanswered philosophical question.
However, considering the motivation of Holocaust rescuers and of
Ersson that was mentioned before, we believe that a person's concern
about their own morality, triggered by the treatment of another group is
still at some level an other-oriented concern, that could benefit victims,
and mitigate bias among perpetrators. Thus, when considering the
tangible outcomes of confronting, we see it as socially beneficial, even if
the motive was egoistic.
4.1. Limitations and future directions
Following the previous argument, one could also question whether
confrontation in our studies were morally courageous in the sense of
involving personal costs to participants. In Experiment 1, in both ima-
gined scenarios we explicitly stated the personal costs involved to
confronting (e.g., jeopardize your position and respect at work; be
verbally or physically attacked). In Experiment 2, in an (allegedly) real
online situation participants were likely concerned that if they confront,
they might “lose face”, or the perpetrator may reply aggressively, or
they sabotage the game and will not get their money. Note, that one
study tested a hypothetical situation and the other one was online, thus
the generalizability of the findings is limited in this respect. Future
research where the study predictions are tested in an in-person, offline
context is needed.
Furthermore, the beneficial effect of induced loss mindset inter-
vention was limited to those who were morally committed to non-
prejudice. However, this is an important population to consider in en-
couraging for intervening because previous findings show that those
with non-prejudiced self-concept are especially likely to justify their
inaction in face of racism through actually derogating the outgroup
(Szekeres, Halperin, Kende, & Saguy, 2019). It remains a direction for
future research to conceive messages (most likely outside of the moral
mindset domain) that would motivate confronting among those who
are less committed to non-prejudice.
4.2. Practical implication
Messages that promote confronting are important because racism is
widespread, and while confronting can be effective in decreasing pre-
judice in perpetrators and bystanders (e.g., Czopp et al., 2006; Czopp &
Monteith, 2003), people who witness racism rarely intervene, although
they believe they would (e.g., Crosby & Wilson, 2015; Karmali et al.,
2017; Kawakami et al., 2009). In the current study, we identified a
process and defined messages that can be utilized as a potentially ef-
fective intervention tool to increase (some) people's tendency to con-
front racism, for example in the form of social ad campaigns or work-
shops. Notably, in Experiment 2, the effect of our intervention seemed
to endure across days, and to affect actual confronting behavior. Ad-
ditionally, due to the feasibility in utilizing the confronting measure, it
can be useful for assessment in devising and testing similar interven-
tions in the future.
4.3. Conclusion
Moral courage is a willingness to take a stand in defense of one's
own moral principles even when others do not (Miller, 2000; Skitka,
2012). In this research, we tested a way to increase morally courageous
behavior and motivate confronting intentions during a situation when
people witness racism. We found that exposing people to messages
about prospective personal moral failure in regard to not intervening
was potentially effective in promoting speaking up against racism.
While moral courage is often thought of as a solely altruistic act, we
argue that the role of an individual's consideration of their own mor-
ality should not be dismissed and can be used to the advantage in en-
couraging moral behavior in face of racist acts.
Appendix A. Participants' demographic questions in Experiment 1 and 2





◦ Other (3) _____________________________________
Your highest education level:
◦ Less than high school (1)
◦ High school diploma (2)
◦ Bachelor's degree (3)
◦ Master's degree (4)
◦ PhD (5)
◦ Other [not included in analyses]
What is the race or ethnicity which you identify the most with?
◦ White or Caucasian (1)
◦ Black/African American/Afro-Caribbean (2)
◦ Latino/Hispanic (3)
◦ Native American (4)
◦ Asian (5)
◦ Arab (6)
◦ Biracial/Mixed: (7) ________________________________________________
◦ Other (8) ________________________________________________
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What is your religion?







What is your socio-political orientation?
Conservative Liberal
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
continuous slider




◦ Don't want to answer (4)
Compared to other people in your society, what is your economic situation?
◦ Wealthy (1)




◦ Destitute (6)coding reversed in study analyses
Appendix B. Moral-prejudice identity self-importance (adapted from Aquino & Reed II, 2002)
Think about a person who is not prejudiced, who is egalitarian and believes that all people are created equal, and who does not discriminate
against people based on their gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity or religion. It could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in
your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of
what this person would be like, answer the following questions.
(9-point scale from 1=not at all true of me to 9= completely true of me)
[Internalization scale]
1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these views and beliefs
2. Being someone who has these views and beliefs is an important part of who I am.
3. I would be ashamed to be a person who has these views and beliefs. (reverse-scored)
4. Having these views and beliefs is not really important to me. (reverse-scored)
5. I strongly desire to have these views and beliefs.
[Symbolization scale]
1. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as having these views and believes.
2. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these views and beliefs.
3. The fact that I have these views and beliefs is communicated to others by my membership in certain organizations.
4. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these views and beliefs.
From the original scale we excluded the following item: “I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics” (symbolization item).
Appendix C. Vignette scenarios and confronting intentions (in Experiment 1)
In this part of the survey, you'll be presented with two ambiguous situations that pose moral dilemmas and you'll be asked questions about it.
Please try to place yourself in those described situations as much as possible. Please respond to the questions honestly, according to your own belief,
and not according to what you think is expected of you.
[Scenario A]
Imagine you are traveling on the bus, sitting in the back. It's a big bus, only a few people traveling on it. An older teenage boy boards the bus, sits
at the back, not far from you, and you hear that he is speaking in Spanish on the phone. Near him, a middle-aged man is sitting, who keeps staring at
the boy. The boy hangs up the phone, and the man starts to speak to him. He tells the boy this is the US, and people speak English here. He continues
and says that immigrants like him [the boy] should leave this country. Because you believe that this specific boy is treated unfairly, you are debating
whether to intervene or not. On the one hand, if you get involved, the man may verbally or even physically attack you. You also don't want to miss
your stop which you are approaching soon. If you miss your stop, you'll be late for an important appointment. [Control condition stopped here]
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[Moral loss framing condition continued with the following text] On the other hand, if you don't get involved, you will probably feel like a bad
person. You believe that this action would reveal a bad side of you. That is, you feel that in this situation staying silent means you are behaving
immorally. You keep thinking that if you want to avoid moral failure, you should probably intervene. [Moral gain framing condition continued
with the following text] On the other hand, if you get involved, you will probably feel like a good person. You believe that this action would reveal
a good side of you. That is, you feel that behaving morally in this situation means speaking up. You keep thinking that if you want to fulfill your
moral ideals, you should intervene.
[Scenario A – Questions]
Based on solely what is described in the text, considering the potential risks involved, how likely it is that in this situation you would perform the
following behaviors? (1= not likely at all to 9= very much likely)
1. I would stay in my seat and I would not get involved. [reversed]
2. I would quietly leave them and move to the front of the bus. [reversed]
3. I would confront the man and tell him he is racist.
4. I would ask the man to stop assaulting the boy.
5. I would sit next to the boy and start talking to the boy in a friendly manner.
6. I would ask the bus driver to stop the man's behavior.
7. Other suggestion (not mandatory, if you don't write, just mark 1): _________
Overall, to what extent you would confront in this situation in order to help the boy?
1= I would not confront at all to 9= I would totally confront on a 9-point scale
[Scenario B]
Imagine you are at work, sitting at your desk, working on a difficult assignment. Then you slowly become attentive to a conversation that two of
your co-workers are having in the adjacent room. You hear them talking about a third co-worker, who is Muslim. You hear them laughing and
making fun of her headscarf, making nasty references about her because of her religion. You don't have many feelings about the mentioned Muslim
co-worker, because you hardly know her, but you also don't think it's nice to talk about another individual like that. So, you are debating to confront
your co-workers or not. On the one hand, you don't want them to think that you often eavesdrop on their conversations. Additionally, you are
working closely with these colleagues, and if they get offended they could even jeopardize your position at work. You also must finish the assignment
you are working on as soon as possible. [Control condition stopped here] [Moral loss framing condition continued with the following text] On
the other hand, you are now recalling other unfair situations you've witnessed in the past and how badly you felt about yourself after not confronting.
You feel it is your moral obligation to intervene. If you don't intervene, you fail your moral duty, and you may later feel like a worse person morally.
You feel you can lose a lot if you don't confront. [Moral gain framing condition continued with the following text] On the other hand, you are
now recalling other unfair situations you've witnessed in the past and how better you felt about yourself after confronting. You feel it is your moral
aspiration to intervene. If you intervene, you succeed to live up to your moral principles, and you may later feel like a better person morally. You feel
you can gain a lot if you confront.
[Scenario B – Questions]
Based on solely what is described in the text, considering the potential risks involved, how likely it is that in this situation you would perform the
following behaviors? (1= not likely at all to 9= very much likely)
1. I would stay in my office and I would not confront them. [reversed]
2. I would sit somewhere else so I don't hear them but I would not confront them. [reversed]
3. I would ask my co-workers to stop insulting her.
4. I would tell my supervisor about my co-workers' conversation.
5. Without being specific, I would just ask them to keep quiet while making sure they know I disprove of their conversation.
6. I would confront my co-workers and tell them they are racists.
7. other suggestion (not mandatory, if you don't write, just mark 1): _________
Overall, to what extent you would confront in this situation in order to stand up for her?
1= I would not confront at all to 9= I would totally confront on a 9-point scale
Appendix D. Moral mindset intervention (in Experiment 2)
Letters are bolded to emphasize the differences between conditions.
[Task 1]
[Loss condition]
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[Gain condition]
Please describe what you think this poster means. (please write min. 350 characters)
[Task 2]
Please see a video that was featured in the local news depicting a British woman insulting other passengers she assumed to be Polish or
immigrants on a public bus: [Here appeared a video]
[Loss condition]
Later when this incident was reported in the news, a passenger on this bus said that he wished he would have stopped the woman from insulting
those other passengers.
Imagine you are this bystander who did not intervene. Please give a short account of your thoughts and feelings.
Start with “I feel like not intervening revealed a bad side of me…”
(please write min. 350 characters)
[Gain condition]
Later when this incident was reported in the news, a passenger claimed that he wished he would have stopped the woman from insulting those
other passengers.
Imagine you are this bystander who did not intervene. Please give a short account of your thoughts and feelings.
Start with “I feel like intervening would have revealed a good side of me…”
(please write min. 350 characters)
[Task 3]
[Loss condition]
Stanislaw Chmielewski (1909–1992) is a Polish Christian man who risked his life to confront injustice and saved a dozen Jews during the
Holocaust. He once noted that not doing what he did would have cost him his moral virtue and he would have felt like a bad person.
Without knowing more about him, how would you describe Stanislaw's potential thoughts and feelings about his own behavior? (please write
min. 350 characters)
[Gain condition]
Stanislaw Chmielewski (1909–1992) is a Polish Christian man who risked his life to confront injustice and saved a dozen Jews during the
Holocaust. He once noted that through this action he gained moral virtue and he feels he became a better person for doing it.
Without knowing more about him, how would you describe Stanislaw's potential thoughts and feelings about his own behavior? (please write
min. 350 characters)
Appendix E. The Trust Game instructions (in Experiment 2)
The participants received the following description of the Trust Game:
You'll be assigned to observe one player and his/her rounds.
Note that this observed player will know you are watching and has an opportunity to send you private messages after each round (we allowed this
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option so the observer feels more real to the player). You will have a chance to message him/her back. Make sure that whatever you say, you do
not reveal the purpose of the study to the player you are corresponding with.
Pay attention to the game - 1, the player might message you and 2, it is beneficial for you to get familiar with the game before you are playing it
yourself.
How do you play the Trust Game?
• Two people are in the game. An amount is given to the first player (for example, $2).
• The first player can decide between three options, to give “ALL” ($2), “HALF” ($1), or “NONE” ($0=keep all the $2) of this amount to the other
player. Let's say s/he decides to give HALF ($1).
• This amount is tripled automatically and given to the opponent ($3).
• The opponent can decide between two options, to “SHARE” the amount with the first player (half it, $1.50) or give back “NONE” (keep all the
$3). Let's say the opponent decides to SHARE ($1.50)
• The game ends.
• The first player won $1 (since s/he kept half of the amount to him/herself in the beginning) plus $1.50 (which the opponent gave back in the
end), ending up in $2.50.
• The opponent won $1.50.
Note, players earn the most money if the first player trusts the opponent and gives “ALL”, and the opponent is fair and chooses to “SHARE”
(giving half of the earned money back). In this case, following the previous example, they would both end up with $3.
Meaning, you can earn the most if you give it ALL and the other player is trustworthy and chooses SHARE.
Appendix F. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103833.
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